Signal on iOS: signal.sqlite, SQLCipher and Keychain
Signal on iOS: the SQLCipher-encrypted grdb/signal.sqlite, the keychain key that opens it, attachments, what backups miss, and millisecond time.
- Location
- /private/var/mobile/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/<UUID>/grdb/signal.sqlite (+ -wal, -shm); attachments under .../Attachments/
- Evidence area
- Proves
- Signal conversations stored on the device: message bodies, direction, author, thread, recipients (phone numbers, ACI and PNI identifiers), attachments and disappearing-message settings
- Timestamps
- Unix time in milliseconds (divide by 1000), UTC
- Acquisition
- Full file system extraction from an AFU device plus the keychain (the database key is stored there). Signal data is not in iTunes / Finder backups
- Retention
- Until deleted by the user, by disappearing-message timers or by conversation length limits the user set; the local copy is usually the only copy
- Collection
- Full file system extraction (with keychain)
Tools
Compare all toolsWhat it is
Signal for iOS stores its messages in a SQLite database managed through the GRDB library and encrypted with SQLCipher. The encryption key is not derived from the user's PIN: it is a random key that Signal generates and stores in the iOS keychain, protected so that it is only available on that device after the first unlock. Without the keychain, the database is unreadable.
Signal also opts out of iCloud and iTunes backups. Moving to a new phone uses Signal's own device transfer, not an iPhone backup. The practical result is that Signal content on an iPhone needs a full file system extraction that also recovers the keychain, from a device in AFU state.
Where it lives
| Item | Path (under the Signal app group container) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Database | grdb/signal.sqlite (+ -wal, -shm) | SQLCipher, with a plaintext header |
| Attachments | Attachments/ | Parsers locate files here; recent app versions may change how attachments are stored at rest, so check yours |
| Key | iOS keychain, in Signal's keychain access group | Needed to open the database |
The container is an app group container for Signal's group (group.org.whispersystems.signal on the builds documented publicly). Keychain items are part of the extraction output of most full file system tools, as a separate file such as a keychain plist.
What it proves
- Incoming and outgoing messages with body, author, thread and times.
- Threads (one-to-one and groups), group names and membership.
- Recipients with phone numbers and Signal service identifiers (ACI, and PNI for phone number identity).
- Attachments linked to messages, including voice notes and images.
- Disappearing-message timers per conversation, and whether a message was viewed or read.
It does not prove who used the device, and linked Signal Desktop or iPad devices can send messages that appear in the same threads.
Key fields
The schema is Signal's own and changes frequently. Documented starting points (verify on your copy after decryption):
| Table | Content |
|---|---|
model_TSInteraction | Messages and other interactions: body, timestamps, thread, record type |
model_TSThread | Conversations and groups |
model_SignalRecipient | Recipients with phone number, ACI and PNI |
| Attachment tables | Attachment metadata linked to interactions |
In model_TSInteraction, the record type distinguishes incoming from outgoing messages (Signal's source defines incoming as 19 and outgoing as 21). Check the Signal-iOS source for the version you are examining before relying on codes.
Timestamps
Signal uses Unix time in milliseconds. Divide by 1000 before converting:
SELECT datetime(timestamp / 1000, 'unixepoch') AS sent_utc,
datetime(receivedAtTimestamp / 1000, 'unixepoch') AS received_utc,
recordType, body
FROM model_TSInteraction
ORDER BY timestamp;
timestamp is set by the sender's device, receivedAtTimestamp by the receiving device. A large gap usually means the device was offline, not tampering.
Retention
Messages stay until deleted by the user, expired by disappearing-message timers, or trimmed by a conversation length limit the user configured. Deleted rows can survive in the WAL and freelist pages of the decrypted database. Because Signal excludes itself from backups, older iPhone backups rarely help.
Collection
- Acquire a full file system with keychain from an AFU device. A BFU extraction will not expose the key.
- Copy the complete Signal app group container, and keep the keychain export next to it with its hash.
- Record the Signal version: schema changes are frequent.
Parsing
- iLEAPP decrypts
signal.sqlitewhen given the keychain (--keychainor the GUI field) and parses messages, recipients and conversations. - Cellebrite, Magnet AXIOM and Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit extract the keychain and decode Signal for supported versions.
- For manual work, open the database with SQLCipher using the key from the keychain and the plaintext header size Signal uses, then export a plaintext copy.
Investigator tips
- No keychain, no Signal. If the extraction lacks it, report that Signal content was not accessible rather than "no Signal messages".
- interactionC.db, notification records and app usage in Biome can still show that Signal was used and with whom, even without the database.
- Compare
timestampvalues with the other party's device if available: Signal timestamps are also message identifiers across devices. - The messaging apps guide compares Signal with WhatsApp, Telegram and iMessage.